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The Experimental Use Exception




Inventor Ivan owns a patent on a new Gizmo. He has spent a
substantial portion of his time and resources to develop the Gizmo. He
has also spent thousands of dollars on his patent attorneys to obtain the
patent. Ivan had to wait over two years for the patent application to be
processed and approved. But it was all worth it. Our patent laws grant
Ivan a negative right-the right to exclude others from practicing his
invention during the period of the patent.'
The local university is using Ivan's invention to further its own
research. The university's research will allow the university to train many
graduate students and could potentially result in large profits for the
university. The university did not seek Ivan's permission to use the
Gizmo. Should the university be liable to Ivan for patent infringement?
Whether Ivan can prevail depends on whether the university can claim
its unauthorized use of the Gizmo is permitted under the experimental
use exception. The experimental use exception is a common law
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. I am very grateful to
Jonathan Cohen, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, William Page, and Sharon Rush for their comments on earlier
drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank Jennifer Coleman, Jocelyn Crocci, and Luke
Napodano for their research assistance.
i. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2ooo) (granting patent rights for twenty years from the filing date of the
patent application); see also id. § 271 (West 2005). "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent." Id. § 271(a).
2. There is another experimental use defense in patent law, also known as the public use
defense, that forbids an inventor from obtaining a patent on an invention if the invention was in public
use or on sale (rather than being used for experimental purposes by the inventor) for more than a year
prior to the date of the patent application. Id. § 102(b). It covers experimentation conducted by the
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exception to the patent-holder's exclusive right of use.3 It permits the use
of another's patented device when such use is for philosophical inquiry,
curiosity, or amusement.4 Judging from the scholarship on this topic to
date, most commentators would probably answer the question posed by
the hypothetical in the negative: the university should not be liable to
Ivan for patent infringement. This Article, however, rejects such an
answer and asserts that the university should be liable.
A. THE OUTCRY FROM MADEY
The experimental use exception has recently come under attack by
many who consider it too narrow.' They fear that the courts' "narrowing"
of the experimental use exception will stifle research and innovation.6
Much of the discontent with the doctrine has been spurred by a relatively
recent Federal Circuit opinion, Madey v. Duke University, which makes
clear that a research university does not receive immunity under the
experimental use exception when its researchers engage in research or
conduct experiments using patented inventions.' This ruling has created
an outcry because over the years universities appear to have assumed,
albeit incorrectly, that their research was protected under the doctrine
and thus that their scientists need not seek permission from patent
owners before using patented devices.
Virtually all commentators since Madey have criticized the ruling
and its effect on the experimental use exception.9 For instance, one
commentator calls it "a seemingly disingenuous opinion that neither
conforms to the implications of precedent nor explains the reasons for
steering the law in a different direction, but pretends that prior courts
inventor himself on the invention. This Article does not address that defense. Rather, it examines the
common law experimental use exception where the courts determine other people's alleged
experimental use of the patentee's invention.
3. It is considered both an exception and a defense to patent infringement. See Janice M
Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (2001).
4. See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3 d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also infra
Part I.
5. See, e.g., Andrew J. Caruso, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception: An Experimentalist's
View, 14 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 215, 220 (2003); Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised
Solution to the Problem Arising From Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 365-66 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does The Public
Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81 (2004); Kevin Sandstrom, Note,
How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening the Experimental Use Exemption to
Patent Infringement in Light of Integra Lifesciences Ltd. v. Merck, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1059,
1067 (2004).
6. See, e.g., id.
7. Madey v. Duke Univ., 3o7 F.3d 1351
, 
1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see infra Part I.B.2.
8. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE I058, 1019 (2003).
9. See supra note 5.
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never meant to give research science special treatment.""0 Similarly,
another commentator asserts that the Madey court "stretched the
concept of commercial use" and that the current experimental use
exception "bears little relation to the implications of a particular
experimental use for the public benefits of follow-on innovation.""
B. A NARROW EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTiON MAKES SENSE
This Article enters the discussion to offer a different and opposing
viewpoint. It takes the position that a narrow experimental use exception
is consistent with existing law, consistent with sound public policy, and
appropriate for the current nature of university research. Contrary to the
picture painted by critics of a rapid "narrowing" of the exception by the
courts, in reality, the experimental use exception has always been very
narrow. To the extent that universities or others have taken liberties with
a broader interpretation of the doctrine, the holding in Madey serves
simply as a wake-up call clarifying the status of the law. Having moved
from a philosophical experimentation model closer to a business for-
profit model in research, it is important to consider the fairness of
treating universities' patent infringement differently from their industry
counterparts.
C. THE NEW FACE OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH
The proper role for the experimental use exception at research
universities is a complex issue with no easy answer. The main reason for
the complexity lies in the changed nature of university research during
the last two decades. University research used to be more akin to
research for the sake of research, with university researchers engaged in
their academic pursuits, anxious to publish their discoveries. Today the
landscape has changed. University research has become more of a
business, and indeed is sometimes difficult to distinguish from industrial
research. Patenting, commercial development, high tech incubators, and
partnerships with industry have become commonplace activities for
universities.
The legal problem posed by the experimental use exception cannot
be divorced from this context. To the extent Madey is viewed as posing a
problem for university research, any consideration of a solution must be
mindful of this shift in the nature of university research. It is not the old
image of university research that should govern, but today's reality.
Admittedly, this poses some tensions because it may be challenging to
reconcile the purely academic norms and interests of university research
with the profit-oriented, businesslike activity it is today. The former may
io. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at ioi9.
i i. Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-46.
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deserve a broader experimental use exception, and perhaps that is why
most critics of the doctrine, impliedly viewing university research from
the "old" lens, disagree with Madey. However, this Article posits that the
better approach entails reviewing the situation through the newer lens in
determining the appropriate rule for patent infringement in university
research.
A noteworthy irony underlies this issue: universities probably have
much more to gain from the strict and narrow interpretation of the
patent laws espoused in this Article than from the alternative (yet more
vocal) viewpoint. That is because universities as a group are large patent-
holders in this country. 2 They gain billions of dollars in revenues
annually from patent licenses and royalties.'3 Any interpretation of the
experimental use exception, or the patent laws generally, that would in
effect permit greater erosion of patent-holders' rights would impose
greater financial detriment to universities than the narrow interpretation
under Madey.
D. THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PATENT PROTECTION AND INCENTIVES TO
INNOVATE
The overarching theoretical question here concerns the tradeoff
between protecting patentees' rights and maintaining incentives to
innovate. It is of course difficult to determine the optimal level of patent
protection for increasing invention and innovation. In the context of the
experimental use exception, this Article posits that a narrow
experimental use exception will have a more positive effect on incentives
to innovate than will a broader exception. A narrow experimental use
exception, the status quo, strengthens incentives to invent and innovate,
while a broad experimental use exception would provide disincentives to
invest in patenting and innovation. This is especially so given the nature
of modern university research and existing patent- licensing practices.
E. THE REALITY OF THE MARKETPLACE
Contrary to virtually all those who have written about the
experimental use exception since Madey, I do not see the Madey opinion
as the death knell of all research and innovation. A closer look at the
practical reality reveals that several considerations inherent in the
business of university research are likely to have a more powerful effect
on the enforcement of the experimental use exception among
researchers than the Madey decision. These considerations provide a
kind of self-regulation that will continue to foster research and
innovation.
12. See infra note 107.
13. See infra Part III.B.
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Moreover, this Article examines two other considerations, not
previously considered in combination by other commentators, which in
effect already expand the experimental use exception, affording greater
protection to universities where applicable. First, a recent United States
Supreme Court opinion, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
broadly interpreted a federal statute, permitting experimentation on
patented drugs prior to expiration of their patents. 4 Thus, university
research involving development of new drugs benefits from this ruling.
Second, state universities enjoy sovereign immunity from patent
infringement suits for damages, giving them far greater protection than
any experimental use exception could provide.
These gaps weigh in favor of saving and safeguarding the doctrine,
rather than leaving it as an empty shell. The experimental use exception
is still of consequence to private universities, individual researchers at
state universities, industrial researchers, and the world of non-drug
development researchers. Because each chip off the doctrine signals a
further erosion of patent-holders' rights and an accompanying harm to
the incentives to invent and innovate, careful consideration of the
doctrine is still required.
In order to make the exclusive rights granted to a patent owner truly
meaningful, not only must the infringement laws be strictly observed, but
exceptions must remain narrow. To do otherwise would threaten to
erode those rights. Not only is broadening the exception a step on a
slippery slope, but any such broadening can be very difficult to identify
and manage, and can threaten to swallow the exception.
In some circumstances, however, strict adherence to the
experimental use exception may stifle experimentation. As a result, any
broadening of the exception should be defined by Congress in specific
situations where a sufficiently compelling case has been made that the
exclusivity granted to a patent owner will have an injurious effect on the
public good and on innovation. Thus, under these circumstances,
society's interests should trump the inventor's patent rights.
Part I of this Article provides background on the experimental use
exception. Part II discusses the Bayh-Dole Act, its alteration of the
landscape of university research, and its impact on university patenting
activity. Part III explains why, in reality, university research will survive a
narrow experimental use exception. Finally, Part IV discusses why the
experimental use exception is appropriately narrow and proposes a test
that ought to guide Congress in deciding when legislative broadening is
necessary.
14. 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2378 (2005); see infra Part I.C.2.
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE EXCEPTION
The experimental use exception is a judicially created doctrine that
limits a patent-holder's exclusive rights. 5 The highlights of its evolution
and its current status in the case law (and legislatively) are described
below. 6 It is important to realize that the exception was intended to be
narrow from the beginning. In Whittemore v. Cutter, the first case to
apply the exception, Justice Joseph Story, ruling for the defendant,
declared in dicta that the patent laws did not intend to punish a person
who infringes a patent "merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its
described effects."' 7 Accordingly, given the broad prohibition against any
use of a patented invention without permission, the task entailed carving
out a sliver of use that would not invade the patent-holder's exclusive
rights. For Justice Story, this sliver included use for purely philosophical
inquiry and use for determining whether the patented device works as it
proclaims.
Further testimony to the exception's narrowness is the rare success
of the defense. 8 It appears that over time, the focus of the inquiry shifted
from whether the alleged infringing use was for profit or financial gain,
to whether it furthered one's legitimate business interests (regardless of
profit). However, the courts never wavered from their extremely narrow
interpretation of the doctrine. When that narrow interpretation was
judicially applied to the pharmaceutical industry, Congress stepped in to
provide the industry with special relief.9 The Supreme Court's
interpretation of that congressional act may now have the effect of
expanding the common law experimental use exception in certain
circumstances.
15. See Mueller, supra note 3, at 19.
16. For a listing of more of the older cases on the doctrine, see generally 5-16 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03 (2004).
17. 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,6oo).
18. Indeed, a review of cases reveals that the defense has defeated a patent infringement claim in
only four instances and without much discussion from the courts on the reasons for such defeat.
Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 376 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (finding the experimental use
exception applicable when alloy was used only for testing and for experimental purposes); Dugan v.
Lear Avia, 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. I944) (holding one device non-infringing under the
experimental use exception because it was not manufactured for sale); Akro Agate Co. v. Master
Marble Co., t8 F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D. W. Va. 1937) (finding experimental use exception applicable
when testing was done before going into commercial production); Finney v. United States, t88
U.S.P.Q. 33, 35 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. I975) (finding the experimental use exception applicable where
NASA used patented glove once during training experiment). The low number of successful cases
utilizing the defense may also be attributable to patentees simply choosing not to sue those infringers
whose activities are truly experimental within the narrow boundaries provided by the courts. As this
Article suggests, there is a self-regulating mechanism in place that guides enforcement of the
experimental use exception. See infra Part III.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION
A. PROFIT OR FINANCIAL GAIN
The earliest cases creating the experimental use exception arose in
the commercial context, involving businesses. It would not be until a
century later that a case involving an academic institution, albeit
indirectly, would arise,"0 and then another sixty-five years would pass
before Madey v. Duke University" would specifically address academic
institutions. This trend is notable in the context of the arguments made
here because it demonstrates how rarely universities have confronted a
legal battle on this issue. The timing also seems significant insofar as the
most recent ruling arrived after the courts shifted the focus of their
analysis from a profit or financial gain inquiry to a broader furtherance
of ongoing business interests determination. Accordingly, even knowing
nothing else about the case law, one would have expected (perhaps more
easily in hindsight) the Madey court to rule as it did.
Originally, the courts focused on whether the alleged infringer
intended to profit from the use of another's patent. If he did, the
experimental use exception did not apply. Ever present throughout these
early discussions was consideration of the effect on the patentee's
exclusive rights. In Sawin v. Guild, Justice Story again applied the
experimental use exception to exempt alleged patent infringers who had
no profit motive." Finding for the defendant, he concluded that those
who use the patented invention "for mere purpose of philosophical
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification"
describing the invention, would not be held liable for patent
infringement. 3 Drawing the line at the intent to profit made sense to this
court because only those who infringe patents with the intent to profit
financially actually deprive the patent owner of his "lawful rewards"
preserved by the patent.4 Accordingly, this case established the profit
motive as the key determinant of whether the experimental use
exception would exempt the alleged infringing activity.
About fifty years later, in I86I, another judge set out the current test
for experimental use in Poppenhusen v. Falke2 The court clarified that
courts had accepted the experimental use defense when the alleged
infringing activity was "for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical
taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement." 7 This test formed the
current "truly narrow" experimental use exception, immunizing only
20. See infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
21. 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
22. 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,39 0 .
23. Id. at 555.
24. d.
25. Mueller, supra note 3, at 20.




those patent infringers seeking amusement or verifying that the
invention worked as it should-not those motivated by financial gain.
In 1935, with Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co.,28 the first
case involving the experimental use exception in the academic research
context was decided. However, the defendant in Ruth was not an
academic institution; rather, the defendant company illegally sold parts
for a patented flotation device to several customers, including the
Colorado School of Mines. 9 Customers who purchased these parts were
able to use the improved device instead of purchasing a new instrument.30
Although finding the defendant liable for contributory patent
infringement, the district court exempted the sales to the Colorado
School of Mines because the school used its instruments in conducting
research.3'
Consistent with its financial gain analysis, the court reasoned that
because the school derived no financial benefit from the use of the
patented device, its infringing research activities fell within the
experimental use exception.32 Academic institutions have interpreted this
decision as providing them with broad protection from patent
infringement when they engaged in research. Indeed, most academic
institutions freely infringed patents until 2002, when the Federal Circuit
clarified the scope of the exemption in Madey v. Duke University
(discussed below in Part I.B.2).33
B. FURTHERING BUSINESS INTERESTS
i. Experimental Use and the Pharmaceutical Industry
The experimental use analysis soon shifted, considering not just the
alleged infringer's profit motive but also whether the use occurred in the
course of business. Accompanying this shift was the recognition that any
use (not just profitable use) of the patentee's exclusive rights was
harmful and in violation of patent laws. That rationale is clear in Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,"4 in which the Federal Circuit
applied the experimental use exception to the pharmaceutical industry.
Bolar used Roche's patented drug compound to develop a generic
version of one of Roche's drugs.35 Bolar was required by law to delay
manufacturing the generic drug until Roche's patent expired; however,
Bolar began the drug testing process (which sometimes takes several
28. 13 F. Supp. 697,703 (D. Colo. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (ioth Cir. 1936).
29. Id. at 699.
30. Id. at 710.
31. Id. at 703.
32. Id. at 713.
33. 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
34. 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
35. Id. at 86o.
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years) before the patent's expiration in order to obtain approval from the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).36 Bolar argued that its testing of
Roche's drug during that period was purely experimental, but the
Federal Circuit disagreed and held that Bolar infringed Roche's
patents-Bolar would not be saved by the experimental use exception.37
According to the Federal Circuit, Bolar's use of the patented drug
during testing violated the plain meaning of "use" in the Patent Act.3
The court noted that use of a patented invention alone, without a
showing that the patent-holder suffered damage or lost sales, was
sufficient to make out a case of patent infringement.39 The fact that
Bolar's activities, at the time of the lawsuit, caused no financial loss to
Roche (since the drug had not been marketed or sold), was not sufficient
to afford it immunity under the experimental use exception.4" Rather, the
court noted Bolar's intent to profit in the future, a disqualification from
experimental use protection.4
It seemed important to the Roche court that Bolar's drug testing
activity fell within its ordinary course of business.42 The court noted that
Bolar's use was "solely for business reasons and not for amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." 3 The court
held that "unlicensed experiments conducted with a view to the adoption
of the patented invention to the experimenter's business is a violation of
the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented
invention."' This language and focus on the "ordinary course of
business" would later prove important in the Madey decision applying
the experimental use exception to academic institutions. The Roche court
emphasized that it would not allow infringing activities to be masked as
experimental use when such activities have "definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes."45 The court noted the lack of
precedential support for permitting infringing activities that contributed
to the infringers' business interests.46
The Federal Circuit again reaffirmed the "very narrow" scope of the
experimental use exception in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering
Corp.47 The plaintiff, Embrex, was the exclusive licensee of a patented
36. Id. at 86o.
37. Id. at 858.
38. Id. at 863.
39. Id. at 861.
40. Id. at 862-63.






47. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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machine for vaccinating chicks before they hatched."' Defendant Service
Engineering designed a similar machine.49 In defending against the patent
infringement claim by Embrex, Service Engineering argued that its
activities merely involved testing its own machine." Holding Service
Engineering liable for patent infringement, the court found these tests
were conducted "expressly for commercial purposes" and did not fit
within the "very narrow" experimental use exemption."
The court reiterated that the experimental use exception would only
apply to activities done "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
strictly philosophical inquiry" and would not apply to any use conducted
under the "guise of scientific inquiry." 2 Additional clarification on the
meaning of that phrase would arrive two years later in a case against
Duke University.'
2. Madey v. Duke University: Laying Down the Law for
Universities
This case is significant, in part, because it was the first infringement
decision by the Federal Circuit that held an academic research institution
liable for infringement for using a patented technology in the course of
its own research. 4 Indeed, many commentators believe the court
rendered the exception worthless to academic institutions. I believe the
case is also significant because it was the first patent infringement action
against an academic institution to reach the Federal Circuit."
The Federal Circuit in Madey found Duke University liable for
patent infringement when Duke continued to use Professor Madey's
patented laser after he left the university. 7 The trial court had held that
Duke's use of the patented laser for basic scientific research was not
aimed at commercial ventures and was thus exempted under the
experimental use exception. 8 However, the Federal Circuit held that
Duke's own patent policies verified the use of the laser as furthering its
"legitimate business objectives."59 The court refused to adopt the trial
court's broad interpretation of the experimental use exception as
applying to any research for academic, experimental, or non-profit
48. Id. at 1346.
49. Id. at 1346-47.
50. Id. at 1349.
51. Id. at 1349-50.
52. Id.
53. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
54. Id. at 1361-63.
55. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 8, at io9.
56. See discussion infra Part III.C.
57. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361-63.
58. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420,426-28 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
59. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
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6opurposes.
The court explained that Duke's status as a non-profit institution
was not determinative, since such academic institutions frequently
conduct research with little or no commercial value.6' Rather, the court
focused on Duke's "legitimate business objectives, including educating
and enlightening students and faculty," and the university's research
which "increase[s] the status of the institution and lure[s] lucrative
research grants, students and faculty.
62
Indeed, the court characterized Duke as a business and all research
done at the university as Duke's line of business, thus removing the
research-and any patent infringement that occurs in the research-from
the experimental use exception. 63 This focus on whether the activity
furthered the alleged infringer's legitimate business interests is not new;
rather, it is entirely consistent with prior opinions. For instance, as early
as 1974, the Court of Federal Claims,6 4 ruling on patent infringement
cases against the United States government's use of allegedly infringing
aircraft, found that the experimental use exception did not apply because
the use furthered the legitimate business of the using agency.
Moreover, the court viewed Duke's own policies regarding the
patenting of research conducted at the university as part of its business
objective. 66 Duke was, to the court, "not shy" about attaining licenses for
its patented work; such licensing revenue contributed to Duke's
"legitimate business."' There seemed to be an implication that Duke
intended to profit from the laser at some point in the future. The court
pointed out that some of the key evidence in the case was dismissed by
the district court, including a statement from Duke's laser lab web site
that expressed interest in corporate partnerships and Duke's
establishment of an hourly fee for any non-academic laser users.6 The
Madey decision is seen as effectively precluding academic institutions
from using the experimental use exception.
69
6o. Id. at 1361-62.
61. Id. at 1362.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The United States Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement
actions against the United States government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2ooo).
65. See Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. 170, 176-77 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1974); see also
Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (refusing to apply
experimental use exception to exempt defendant's cloning experiments because "they were done as
part of the ongoing business activities of defendant...."); Pitcairn v. United States, 188 U.S.P.Q. 35,
47 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1975).
66. Madey, 3o7 F.3 d at 1362 n.7.
67. Id. at 1363 n.7.
68. Id. at 1356 n.5.
69. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at lOI9.
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C. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: CONGRESS OVERTURNS ROCHE
The Roche decision caused an uproar because of the perceived
damaging implications for generic drug makers and ultimately for
consumers. If generic drugs could not be tested during the life of the
patented drug, they would not be able to reach the market until years
after the expiration of the patent term on the pioneer drug.7' Congress
stepped in to overturn Roche, enacting the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act.7'
i. Description of the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act, at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(I), is a codified
version of the experimental use exception for the pharmaceutical
industry. The statute, in relevant part, provides that it is not "an act of
[patent] infringement to... use... a patented invention.., solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the.., use... of
drugs .... ,,71 The Act provides a safe harbor, permitting drug
manufacturers to perform experiments needed to obtain FDA approval
of their drugs, even if those experiments are conducted during the patent
life of a patented drug being tested-an otherwise infringing use.73 In
addition, the Act lengthens the patent term for drugs requiring FDA
approval before entering the market.74 It also exempts certain activities
that would otherwise amount to infringement.75
The Act is intended to achieve some balance between the competing
interests of the patent-holder on the one hand and those of the generic
drug maker on the other. It grants an extension to the original patent-
holder's patent term, since several years of the patent's original term
were lost during the FDA approval process and before the drug entered
the market. 6 In exchange, generic drug manufacturers may use the
original patented drug during testing, permitting the drug to complete
the FDA approval process and be ready for market release as soon as the
original patent expires.' The Act provides that making, using, or selling a
patented invention "solely for uses reasonably related" to gathering data
in order to acquire approval under the federal laws that regulate drug
7o.A pioneer drug is the patented drug; a generic is the non-patented version of the pioneer
drug. See Abbott Lab. v. Zenith Lab., Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) i8Oi, 18o5 (N.D. I11. 1995).
71. Mueller, supra note 15, at 25.
72. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(i) (2000).
73. Id. §§ 156,271.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 271(e)(i).
77. Id. See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CRISUM ON PATENTS, § 16.O3[I] (2004).
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manufacture, use, or sale, is not an act of patent infringement."
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to cover more than
drugs; it also covers testing of medical devices, which, like
pharmaceuticals, are subject to a lengthy FDA approval process.79 The
Court reasoned that the sections of the Act are complementary in that all
of the products eligible for a patent term extension under section 201 of
the Act are also subject to section 202's exemption for early testing.,°
Thus, medical devices, food additives, color additives, new drugs,
antibiotic drugs, infant formula,8' and human biological products (all of
which are subject to pre-market approval by the FDA) are covered
under the testing exemption.82 Accordingly, patent-holders of both drugs
and medical devices must tolerate the infringing activities of competitors
who conduct FDA approval tests prior to the expiration of the patent
terms."
2. The Supreme Court Interprets the Hatch-Waxman Act
Recently, in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., the U.S.
Supreme Court considered early pre-clinical studies conducted by Merck
that were not ultimately included in submissions to the FDA."' The Court
held these studies exempt under the safe harbor provision. 8' The Court
vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit, which had reasoned that the
experiments did not receive safe harbor protection because they had not
been included in FDA submissions and constituted merely " eneral
biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds."
The Supreme Court noted that early in the experimentation and
testing process, it is difficult to ascertain what will ultimately be
submitted to the FDA because of the trial and error inherent in the
process. 87 The exception is generic drugs, because it is known at the
outset that a particular compound, which is identical to the drug already
approved, will be submitted to the FDA.8 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the rule espoused by the Federal Circuit would limit
the safe harbor to generics only, an interpretation that the Court
rejected." Instead, the Court focused on the phrase "reasonably related,"
interpreting it broadly to cover all activity that one intending to develop
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).
79. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671 (i99o).
8o. Id. at 673.
81. Id. at 674 n.6.
82. Id. at 673-74.
83. Id. at 673.
84. 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2378 (2005).
85. Id. at 2379.
86. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, at *15 (Fed. Cir. June 6,2003).
87. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2382.




a particular drug has a reasonable basis for believing may be included in
a submission to the FDA if successful.' The fact that the experiment may
prove unsuccessful is not relevant.9 '
While the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of section
271(e)(I) represents a victory for those wishing to conduct testing in
order to obtain regulatory approval before the expiration of a patent, the
ruling will likely have a negative effect on drug research patents.
Arguably, these research patents will lose most, if not all, of their
commercial value.92
II. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
ACADEMIC RESEARCH
Historically, the federal government owned all rights to research
sponsored by federal funds; such research typically was not patented
because it was considered "public research." 93 While "public research"
was immediately and freely available to the public, "commercial
research" funded by private investment was kept secret until patented
and able to generate revenue by license.94 Congress recognized that the
collaboration between scientific research and business would allow rapid
and efficient commercial development of basic research.95
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole University and Small
Business Patent Procedures Act (the "Bayh-Dole Act"), which allowed
private ownership of patented inventions resulting from research funded
by the federal government. 6 It permitted universities, small businesses,
and nonprofit institutions to hold patents on the inventions they
generated with public money.9" Its purpose was to accelerate the
development of inventions that would benefit the public.98 The federal
government retained some rights to the inventions, but assigned most of
90. Id. at 2382-83. The Court articulated its test as follows: "At least where a drugmaker has a
reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work, through a particular biological
process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if
successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 'reasonably related'
to the 'development and submission of information under... Federal law."' Id. at 2383.
9I. Id.
92. If one can infringe drug research patents without consequence, and there is no other use for
these patented tools, then there is virtually no incentive for one to invest in obtaining these patents.
See Brief of Amici Curiae, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al., at 15-19, Merck KGaA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2378 (2005) (No. 03-1237) [hereinafter Wisconsin Amicus
Brief].
93. See Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins v.
CellPro March-In Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211, 211-12 (2000).
94. Id. at 212.
95. Id. at 213.
96. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 200.
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its property rights to the research labs.' This Act recognizes the great
public value of allowing academic institutions to pursue commercial
development of their federally funded research." The Act has fueled a
major change with respect to universities and patents. As one
commentator notes, "universities have become players in the patent
system in a way that could hardly have been imagined before the Bayh-
Dole Act."''
A. CHANGES IN ATTITUDE ABOUT UNIVERSITY DISCOVERIES
Money changes everything. That phrase encapsulates the new trend
in university research. The fact that university research now had
commercial value ushered in a new attitude toward research and
patenting. While at one time the premise was that basic research should
be freely available to everyone, now that discoveries could have
commercial value and financial rewards, it became more important to
treat research as private property.' Additionally, before the Bayh-Dole
Act, federally sponsored university research generally required the
assignment of patents to the government and free licensing to all those
interested."'° Now, however, universities could keep royalties and
licensing fees. As a result, a stream of revenue arrived at a time when
government funds for research were decreasing and universities' need for
additional funding was increasing.' 4 On an individual level, inventors
were then also able to share royalties with the university, further adding
to their profit incentives, and perhaps affecting which experiments were
pursued."'° Together, these factors, among others, have changed
patenting activity and the research business at universities.
B. UNIVERSITIES PROFIT FROM PATENT LICENSES
The Bayh-Dole Act can be seen as a mandate to universities to
obtain patents and commercialize their inventions, a mandate that
99. Id. § 2o2(c)(4) ("With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights, the
Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or
have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world . .
too. See id.
ioi. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at ioiS8.
102. See Suzanne T. Michel, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied
to Federally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 378-79 (1992).
103. See generally Valoir, supra note 93.
io4- See I NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2002, at 0- 1I (2002),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seindo2/pdf/volumei.pdf. In the early 196os, the federal
government began a trend of compensating for a continually shrinking share of federal research and
development funds. By 1979, the federal share fell below fifty percent and declined even more steeply
during the 199os. Since the second half of the 198os, federal research and development actually
declined after adjusting for inflation. Additionally, federal research and development was essentially
flat during the past decade. Id.; see also Michel, supra note 102, at 379.
105. See Michel, supra note 102, at 380.
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universities have taken seriously over the last twenty years."" Its impact
on the business of university research is enormous. While in 1981
universities were awarded 436 patents, by 2001 that annual figure
climbed to 3,203.' ° Sizeable revenues have also accompanied the growth
in university patents." In 1997, universities earned about $500 million in
gross revenues from patents."° A recent survey of 156 colleges and
universities revealed that the institutions earned almost $I billion in
combined licensing revenues last year.'
One need look no further than the biotechnology industry over the
last few years to see the strong influence of university patent ownership.
"[T]he biotechnology industry as we know it today began on university
campuses in the United States .... Universities have served as sources of
numerous patent biomedical inventions as well as founders or affiliates
of start-up firms based on their patents."' Public and private universities
receive about one billion dollars in gross license revenues from their
intellectual property."3 For instance, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology received $5.5 million in licensing fees in I99I.1' These
figures illustrate the increasing collaboration between university research
and private enterprise that the Bayh-Dole Act was meant to achieve.
C. UNIVERSITIES ENFORCE THEIR PATENT RIGHTS
Along with the growth in their patent portfolios, universities have
aggressively enforced their patents in court. Many of these lawsuits have
led to very large settlement or damages awards. A few are mentioned
here. The University of California sued Genentech and settled for $200
io6. See Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note 92, at 19-21.
i07. See 2 NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2004, A5-1o3, A5-1O5(2004), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/sceindo4/pdf-v2.html [hereinafter NATIONAL SCIENCE
BOARD 2004].
io8. Universities with highly successful patents realize larger profits than most other institutions,
whose licensing revenues tend to constitute a smaller part-approximately four percent-of their
budget. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing
Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, lO87-88 (2005).
109. I NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2000, at 6-57 (2000),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seindoo/c6/co6.pdf (During 1989-9o
, 
the reported income
flows from licenses totaled a mere $82 million, reaching $483 million in 1997.).
Ito. Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2002, at 62 (Ashley J.
Stevens ed., 2003), available at http://www.autm.net/events/file/surveyS/02_abridged survey.pdf
[hereinafter AUTM LICENSING SURVEY]: see also Susie Poppick, Yale Keeps Patent Stats Secret, YALE
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 2004, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=276 58.
IIi. Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note 92, at 3.
112. John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 286 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A.
Merrill eds., 2003) [hereinafter Walsh et al., Effects].
113. AUTM LICENSING SURVEY, supra note I1o, at 62.
114. Michel, supra note 102, at 380 n.59.
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million."5 The University of Minnesota sued Glaxo Wellcome and won a
$300 million settlement. ' I6 Emory University just recently collected $540
million in royalty fees (believed to be the largest settlement for a
university to date) to settle litigation on some drug patents."7 Several
other universities including Cornell University," Columbia University, 9
Harvard,'20 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,'2 ' and University
of Rochester'22 have also sued to enforce their patents. Sometimes, a
university may even appear as a co-plaintiff with a corporation on one
patent and a defendant against it on another.'2 3 In 2004, the University of
Colorado and Cornell University were awarded a $2.1 million judgment
and $4.5 million in damages and interest against Laboratory Corporation
of America.'24 Interestingly, they do not appear to be suing each other for
patent infringement.'
D. UNIVERSITIES' RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDUSTRY
Universities are now partners and collaborators with industry. For
instance, a few years after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, a study
revealed that industry funded about twenty-five percent of all
biotechnology research at universities. 6 Today, that number has likely
115. Marcia Barinaga, Genentech, UC Settle Suit for $2oo Million, 286 SCIENCE 1655 (999).
i6. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1036, io36 (D. Minn.
'999).
117. Meredith Hobbs, A $54oM Payday Caps Patent Fight, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at 8.
I 8. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings. 370 F.3 d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(action for patent infringement brought by plaintiffs including Creative Technologies, Inc., a
representative of the University of Colorado and Cornell University).
I I9. In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 330 F. Supp. 2d 18, I8 (D. Mass. 2004).
i2o. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 02-II28o-RWZ, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3170, at *I-
*2 (D. Mass. Mar. 3, 2004) (action for patent infringement brought by plaintiffs including MIT and
Harvard).
121. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecomms., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1o7
(D. Mass. 2003); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Speedera Networks, Inc., No. 02-Ioi88-RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15903, at *I-*2 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2002).
122. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
123. Compare Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. IP 02-0512-C-B/S, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14724, at *2-*3 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004) (action by Eli Lilly & Co. for pharmaceutical patent
infringement with MIT as an involuntary plaintiff), with Ariad Pharms, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS
3170, at *i-*2 (action by MIT against Eli Lilly & Co. for pharmaceutical patent infringement). As a
general rule, a patent owner must join the exclusive licensee of the patent in any infringement action
brought by the licensee. See Erbamont Inc. v. Cetus Corp., 720 F. Supp. 387,393 (D. Del. 1989).
124. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
125. See infra Part IV.C. The infringement suits in which universities are defendants tend to be
declaratory judgment actions where the plaintiff seeks a ruling that the university's patent is invalid
(after the university has filed or threatened to file an infringement action). See, e.g., Medlmmune, Inc.
v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3 d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005); New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1999); Synbiotics Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Nos.
93-1253, 94-1079, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23902, at *I (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 1994).
126. David Blumenthal et al., Industrial Support of University Research in Biotechnology, 231
SCIENCE 242, 244 (1986).
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increased in all areas.'
Companies enjoy the access to university researchers as it enhances
their competitive position. Industry involvement takes various forms,
including: (i) the university could be under contract to conduct specific
experiments; (ii) the university could provide continuing education to a
company's researchers; (iii) the university could have a grant directed at
a specific researcher or project; (iv) the university may form a review
board that includes corporate members to decide which university
projects will be funded; or (v) the university professors may enter
commercial ventures (such as starting companies or partnering with
venture capitalists to commercialize research).2'
III. THE PRACTICAL REALITY: RESEARCH WILL LIVE ON
Despite the cries of impending doom, the Madey decision does not
signal the death of research and innovation in universities. In reality, the
decision will probably have little effect on the way researchers conduct
their day-to-day business.'29 This is mostly because the research
marketplace will continue to guide and control the conduct of
researchers and patent-holders (especially considering the frequent role
reversal of these parties), thus providing an appropriate balance between
enforcing patent rights and allowing innovation. In a recent survey, none
of the respondents reported having to discontinue projects because of
problems involved in obtaining intellectual property rights for their
research.3' Instead, they have adopted "working solutions" to
intellectual property issues in their research. 3'
One of the ironies of the controversy surrounding the experimental
use exception is that the Madey decision is both a blessing and a curse for
universities. On the one hand, universities criticize the narrowness of the
exception, particularly its elimination of the long held (albeit erroneous)
127. Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-
Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453,479 (1997).
128. Michel, supra note 102, at 381.
All of the earliest genetic engineering companies were founded by professors who
completed the initial research in university laboratories. For instance Genentech, co-
founded by Herbert Boyer to exploit the Cohen-Boyer gene splicing patent, did not have a
laboratory in its early stages, so Boyer's campus laboratories at UCSF were used.
Id. at 382.
129. See Cristina Weschler, Note, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research
After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1552-62 (2004) (discussing how non-legal
solutions protect university research).
130. John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003)
[hereinafter Walsh et al., Working].
131. Id. These solutions include (i) obtaining licenses from patent-holders, (ii) developing and
participating in public and quasi-public databases that make information available, (iii) inventing
around patents, (iv) going overseas, (v) filing suit against patent-holders (e.g., seeking a declaratory
judgment), and (vi) using the- technology without a license (a practice that is admittedly very common
among university researchers). Id.
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belief in their immunity from patent infringement for research activities.
On the other hand, however, as major patent-holders, universities benefit
from a strict and narrow interpretation of the exception. Millions of
dollars in licensing revenues and royalties would be lost, for instance, if
all research were exempted from infringement until commercialized.
There are several considerations, discussed more fully below, that
alone and in conjunction effectively self-regulate the business of
university research. These factors permit university researchers to
experiment without much fear of suit, particularly where their activities
are not commercial or profit-making in nature. Further, the innovation
process in practice, especially to the extent that universities are involved,
is not one of exclusive competition but rather one of cooperation and
sharing of research information.'32 Together, these factors ensure that
research and innovation will continue to thrive.
A. THE EFFECT OF MERCK V. INTEGRA
The ultimate effect of the Merck opinion on the common law
experimental use exception is that it provides a wide exemption that
serves to enlarge the experimental use exception when the research
involves use protected under the Hatch-Waxman Act.'33 Interestingly,
one of the beneficiaries of the opinion will be universities. To the extent
the opinion can be read as permitting all drug experimentation, not only
for generics but for pioneer drugs as well,'34 research universities benefit
directly when their research includes the development of new drugs.
Moreover, because the safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act
extends not only to submissions to the FDA but also to research
reasonably related to submission under a federal program, Merck casts a
wide net of exemptions, all to the benefit of research universities.
Granted, the opinion does not eradicate the narrow effects under Madey,
in that it does not cover all of the kinds of research that may be
conducted at universities, but it does provide some immunity to areas
that heretofore would not have been protected under the experimental
use exception.
132. Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad
Exception, Ioo YALE L.J. 2169, 2181 (99si). Obviously, there are occasions when the general culture of
sharing breaks down. In Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), for instance, Madey
chose to sue his former employer, rather than allow it to continue to use his lasers. While we may not
be privy to the specific motivations and deliberations in that case, one can imagine that there may have
been underlying difficulties in their relationship, perhaps leading to, or as a result of, Madey's
separation from employment with the university. Absent these kinds of tensions, however, the spirit of
cooperation ought to prevail.
133. See supra Part I.C.i.
134. A pioneer drug is the patented drug; a generic is the non-patented version of the pioneer
drug. See Abbott Labs. v. Zenith Labs., 934 F. Supp. 925,931 (N.D. I11. 1995).
135. The Act has already been interpreted to cover medical devices. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 496 U.S. 66i, 664, 679 (i99o).
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B. LICENSING: JUST ASK NICELY
It has become commonplace among university researchers to use
patented devices without seeking a license.' 36 At the risk of stating the
obvious, university researchers (like all others) need to ask for a license
in order to use a patented invention as required by law. Although
additional costs may accompany such a request, to complain about those
costs does not provide a sufficiently compelling reason to grant an
exception. Just as a long-time tax evader earns no sympathy when the
time arrives to make payments to the Internal Revenue Service,
universities' complaints about now having to pay licensing fees are
unpersuasive.
Licensing is a routine and integral part of the intellectual property
business.'37 Indeed, most universities already have technology transfer
offices that handle intellectual property issues, including licensing
arrangements, 3s with an indicator of success measured by licensing
revenue.'39 Granted, seeking out and obtaining licenses may prove
cumbersome; however, such difficulty in and of itself should not serve as
a reason for noncompliance."0
Further, the fear that research will be hampered because researchers
will need to spend all their time tracking down patents and negotiating
licenses is misplaced. In practice, very few licenses need to be negotiated
on any given project.'' Although many potentially applicable patents
may need to be reviewed at the outset, of those, only a few will actually
be relevant, and in the end, a handful or less will need to be licensed.'42
With respect to costs, universities also have an advantage in that many
patent-holders provide discounted licenses to universities, often for less
than half the market rate.'
There also does not appear to be any evidence that patent-holders
will impede research by unreasonably refusing to grant licenses to
universities.'" To the contrary, denied access to intellectual property
136. Walsh et al., Working, supra note 130, at 1021. In the Walsh study, all of the university
respondents admitted using patented research tools without permission at times.
137. See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., An Overview of the Virginia UCITA, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2oo1),
available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v8il/articlei.html.
138. See Kapczynski et al., supra note lO8, at io8o-81.
139. Id. at io85.
140. Universities may be able to devise a relatively accessible procedure for their researchers to
obtain licenses by posting guidelines or forms on their websites. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. System of
Intellectual Property Reference Page, at http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/index.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2005).
141. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 112, at 294.
142. Id. at 294-95.
143. Weschler, supra note 129, at 1553-55.
144. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 219 (1987); Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 1103.
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rights very rarely leads to the termination of a worthwhile project.'45
Rather, other considerations, such as lack of confidence in the technical
success of the project, market demand, and limited internal resources,
account for the decision to discontinue a project.' 46 Even in the rare
instance where a project might be terminated because of licensing
difficulties, one commentator has suggested that the social cost of not
pursuing projects is low, given the vast array of other available projects. '
Another market force facilitating cooperation among researchers
seeking licenses is the repetitive nature of the licensing game. A licensing
negotiation between a university and a patent-holder is often not a one-
time event; the parties may find themselves in the future negotiating (or
may already have negotiated) other patents, and it is important that they
show respect for the quid pro quo by maintaining a good relationship and
remaining reasonable.'
Licensing could have avoided the litigation in both Madey and
Merck. In Madey, Duke argued that it had a license under grants
received by the federal government, but none of the pertinent contracts
defined the scope of these rights.'49 Accordingly, the university's rights to
the invention were not clearly delineated. The better practice would have
entailed negotiating a license from Madey, the inventor, to Duke at the
outset of Madey's employment.'5 ° In Merck, the parties attempted but
failed to reach a license agreement.'5 ' To the extent such failure occurred
because the patent-holder was unreasonable, it provides a lesson to
patent-holders in licensing negotiations: be cooperative, or you may lose
big, not only in the eventual outcome, but also through the very
expensive and risky litigation process.' 2
The National Academy of Sciences (the Academy), which has no
legal authority but wields influence over particular scientific journals,
issued a decree in early 2003, urging, among other things, the licensing of
145. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 112, at 298.
146. Id. at 298, 304. One respondent in the Walsh survey said, "I am hard pressed to think of a
piece of research that we haven't done because of blocked access to a research tool." Id. at 298.
147. Seeid. at3o5.
Some respondents have suggested that the value of targets has actually declined
substantially because companies can't exploit all of the targets they have, and so firms are
more willing to license some of their targets, or abandon some of their patents and let the
inventions shift to the public domain, because maintaining large portfolios of low-value
patents is expensive.
Id. at 305.
148. Id. at 326.
149. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3 d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
15o. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
151. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 86o, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
152. For many plaintiffs, the risk that the patent at suit will be invalidated is a high and very real
risk. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 234 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)
(invalidating the university's drug patent).
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patented materials.'53 The organization also encourages patent-holders to
issue equal license fees to everyone, regardless of whether the request
comes from academia or industry because "[t]here is no clear line
between the 'for-profit sector' and 'academic' research."'54 When
granting exclusive licenses to industry, however, universities must be
mindful that they may want to reserve some of their rights in order to
permit future licensing to those in the academic community.'55 While it is
too early to tell if the scientific community will abide by its own policing,
the Academy's decree reflects a sign of the cooperative spirit that
underlies academic research.
C. TOLERATING UNIVERSITIES' PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Madey is the first case in which a university was sued for patent
infringement. 5  That telling statement supports my argument that
universities are not likely to be sued for infringement. Even in Madey,
the facts are unusual because the case arose not out of the typical
situation where a competitor sues another, but out of an employer-
employee dispute."'
The points below help to explain why universities are unlikely to be
sued for patent infringement. Indeed, universities tend to ignore
notification of infringement letters, particularly when they are not
engaging in commercially related research. 5 "So long as the university is
not generating revenue based on the patented technology, universities
appear to be largely left alone, although some firms will send letters."'59
Universities are also not inclined to sue each other, especially when the
alleged infringer is not commercializing the innovation.
i. The Honor System
Common sense dictates that it is simply not possible for patent-
153. COMMITTEE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, NAT'L. ACAD.
ScI., SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE
LIFE SCIENCES 7 (2OO3), available at http://fermat.nap.edulbooks/o3o9o88593/htmlI/ (last visited Mar. 4,
2006).
154. Id. at 67.
155. See Kapczynski et al., supra note io8, at lo76.
156. The infringement suits in which universities are defendants tend to be declaratory judgment
actions where the plaintiff seeks a ruling that the university's patent is invalid (after the university has
filed or threatened to file an infringement action). See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409
F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Synbiotics Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Inc., 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23902, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1994); New Star Lasers and Laser Aesthetics, Inc. v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see also supra note 116.
157. Usually the employer retains the patent rights to inventions, but in this case the inventor
owned the rights. When he changed employers, there was no license given to the new employer. See
RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 1:8.5 (3d ed. 1999).
158. See Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 112, at 317.
159. Id. at 319.
I6o. See id. at 327.
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holders to monitor the activities of researchers and scientists in their
private labs. The system relies on an honor system of sorts requiring the
researchers themselves to come forward, seek out the patent-holder, and
ask for permission. When research becomes public (generally through
publication) and/or commercialized, infringement becomes easier for a
patent-holder to detect. In addition, many researchers may choose to
wait until that time to seek permission from patent-holders.' In some
cases, the six-year statute of limitations6 may expire before infringement
is even discovered.
6 3
2. Difficulties of Litigation
While in theory it may appear easy (based on the definition of
infringement) for a patent-holder to vindicate her rights where a
university or other party has infringed them, the reality is far different.
This is due to the costs, both financial and otherwise, of patent litigation.
For starters, a potential plaintiff contemplating filing suit must consider
the time and cost involved: such a suit may not resolve for years and
could cost millions of dollars in attorney's fees alone, with no guarantee
of success."
It is also important that the patentee be able to recover significant
damages in order to make this endeavor worthwhile. Thus, where a
patented invention, although infringed, has not generated profits or
proven commercially successful, it simply does not make sense to pursue
aggressively an infringement claim. Therefore, this grants universities de
facto immunity for purely research-related infringement activities that do
not generate revenues for the institution.
In addition to the time and energy one expends worrying about each
step of the case, there is also the time drain on all the individuals
associated with the patented invention. For instance, everyone in the
patent-holder's organization may be involved in discovery, searching and
copying years of files and preparing and responding to written and oral
discovery. 65 The patentee also takes the risk that the patent at suit will be
invalidated, an occurrence that is not uncommon."
161. See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, BROOKuNGS PAPERS ECON. AcnvTY: MICRtOECON. 783, 807 (1987).
62. 35 U.S.C.A. § 286 (West 2006).
63. Walsh et al.. Working, supra note 13o, at 1021; see also David J.F. Gross & Lee Pulju. Ten
Things to Consider Before Sending A Patent Infringement Warning Letter, 15 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 12,
13 (2003).
64. See Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 112, at 315.
65. See id.
r66. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205-07 (1998) (finding that forty-six percent of patents were
invalidated in cases litigated between 1989 to 1996).
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3. University Relationships Are Important
For a host of intangible reasons, a culture of not suing universities
appears to exist. In part, potential litigants fear that such suits will result
in bad publicity because "it is not good form to sue researchers in
academic institutions and stifle their progress." '67 Industry also has much
to gain by developing trusting relationships with university researchers. '68
Some scientists even admitted that they welcome a low level of
patent infringement because such "background infringement" can
contribute to the value of their invention by generating interest in the
new technology. ' This is because of the belief that those who utilize a
particular new technology to solve a research problem are likely to
continue to use that technology-and share it with others-in the future.
Thus, when the "background infringement" becomes too great, the
patent-holders assert their property rights against the infringers by
offering a license to use the invention. The infringing scientists are then
forced either to obtain a license for the technologies they have used in
their research methods or search for new methods to solve the
problems.70
D. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR STATE UNIVERSITIES
A narrow experimental use exception poses an even lower threat of
impending doom to academic researchers given the immunity conferred
on a significant number of universities because of their status as public
institutions."' Trying to avoid this result, Congress (using its Article i
powers) passed legislation in 1992 that expressly abolished sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for states and state
employees who engage in patent infringement.'72 In 1999, however, the
Supreme Court held the law unconstitutional in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank.'73 The
Court reasoned that state sovereign immunity can only be abrogated
167. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 112, at 325.
168. In the Walsh survey, one respondent from a private firm noted:
We rely on lots of outside collaborations with academic labs. Our scientists want to feel on
good terms with the academic community. If you start suing, it breaks down the good
feeling. We give out our research tools for free, frequently. All we ask is, if you invent
anything that is directly related to the tool, you allow us the freedom to practice.
Id. at 326.
169. See id.
170. See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 463,463 (1995).
171. Approximately forty percent of degree granting postsecondary institutions are public. See
Degree-Granting Postsecondary: Enrollment, The Digest of Education Statistics, 2003, ch. 3, at 310 tbl.
246 (Dec. 31, 2004) (degree-granting institutions, by control and type of institution: 1949-1950 to
2002-2003); see also text accompanying note 177.
172. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-56o, § 2(a)(2),
lo6 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2000)).
173. 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment, not under Congress' Article I
powers.'74 Since Congress did not provide a basis under the Fourteenth
Amendment for abolishing state immunity from patent infringement
liability, the law was unconstitutional.' 5 Accordingly, state entities,
including state universities, are immune from patent infringement suits.
This ruling is particularly significant here because public universities
sit front and center in patenting activity. Approximately sixty percent of
the patents issued to universities in 2001 went to public universities." 6
Thus, their immunity from infringement damages is very significant. For
all practical purposes, these universities essentially have wide latitude to
infringe, and patent-holders have little recourse.'77 An experimental use
exception-narrow or broad-has less impact on state universities as
defendants because, unlike their private counterparts, they are
insulated.' 78 They are in the rare and enviable position of having the best
of both worlds: they can sue others for patent infringement but cannot be
sued for the same practice.
Allowing state universities sovereign immunity from patent
infringement may have the unforeseen consequence of indirectly
granting immunity to private industry collaborators who shift resources
to the university for just such protection.'79 It is currently unknown what
level of state funding or control will make a collaborative endeavor an
instrumentality of the state (and thus protected Under state immunity),
rather than a disguised extension of the private industry collaborator. ' 8°
IV. THE EXEMPTION IS APPROPRIATELY NARROW
This Article does not support a judicial broadening of the
experimental use exception. In order for the exception to remain limited
and thereby make meaningful a patent-holder's rights to exclusivity, the
174. Id. at 637.
175. Id. at 639-43.
176. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD 2004, supra note IO7, at A5-Io5. The top ten patenting public
universities from 1991 to 2001 were University of California, University of Texas, University of
Wisconsin, University of Florida, State University of New York, University of Michigan, Iowa State
University, University of Minnesota, Michigan State University, and University of Washington. Id.
177. However, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, state workers may be sued in federal court in
their individual capacity. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (i9o8); see also Peter S. Menell,
Symposium on New Direction in Federalism: Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2o00). Further,
although patent-holders cannot obtain monetary compensation from the state, they may obtain
injunctive relief. See id. However, injunctive relief against a state university under Eleventh
Amendment state immunity would still make litigation expensive and time-consuming. Id.
178. For further discussion about state universities' immunity from intellectual property claims see
Traci Dreher Quigley, Comment, Commercialization of the State University: Why the Intellectual
Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003 is Necessary, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2004).
179. Mueller, supra note 15, at 33-34.
I8o. See id. at 36.
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exception must be kept narrow. To do otherwise would risk enlarging the
exception to a point where it swallows the rule prohibiting patent
infringement. Even recognizing that, as with most rules, there may be a
sufficiently compelling reason to create an exception to the exception,
there has been no evidence presented indicating why research
universities deserve special treatment in this area. To the extent that the
business of a university, as it pertains to research, has become
indistinguishable from the business of a commercial research lab, it
seems only fair that the rules should apply equally to both.
Infringement is not a matter of degree. Courts have made clear that
there is no such thing as de minimis infringement.' Thus, any exceptions
to infringement should be similarly specific and not open to a question of
degree or to an evaluation of merit. In particular, where a university has
infringed a patent through its research activities, it should not be up to
the courts to decide and assess the nature of the infringement, the intent
of the researcher, or whether the infringement led to the discovery of a
commercially viable product."'
Moreover, a broad experimental use exception would provide
disincentives to invest in patenting and innovation. Weakening a
patentee's control over her patented invention deprives her of the
pecuniary benefits associated with the patent, thus reducing the returns
from her investment in the invention. Further, a broad exception would
also discourage investors from devoting capital resources to research and
development projects that could have yielded future returns from a
patent. ' 83
A. PATENTING PROMOTES INNOVATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
Innovation is important not only for commercial profits but also
because it advances the public good. The patent system encourages
innovation by rewarding the substantial investments necessary for
research and development. It promotes invention by granting the
inventor an exclusive right to exclude others from her invention and
giving her the ability to profit from it. Patenting also leads to greater
efficiency by encouraging the invention of new and better products.'84
In addition, the patent system promotes the development and
commercialization of inventions. There are several stages between the
initial invention of a product and the commercial development of the
product to a point where it is ready for market. Getting from one point
I81. See, e.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
182. Any such analysis should be legislatively defined, as in the Hatch-Waxman Act. See infra Part
IV.D.
183. See Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a
Broad Exception, IOO YALE L.J. 2169, 2181 (1991).
184. WARD S. BOWMAN JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 2-3 (1973).
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to the other is costly and risky.'85 By preventing others from using the
invention for a certain period of time, the patent system permits the
inventor to recoup the costs of developing the product. But for these
exclusive rights, free-riders may take advantage of other's inventions,
without having expended the resources for development.' 86 Free-riding
can hurt the inventor's ability to realize a return on her investment.87
The disclosure required by the patent system' 88 is a further benefit to
society. It requires inventors to make information publicly available that
ordinarily would remain undisclosed as a trade secret. This benefits both
the public and the inventor. It benefits the public by helping to avoid
needless duplication of efforts.'" For instance, a competitor may learn
the results of a certain experiment and be more accurately informed
about whether to pursue the project. Competitors also learn through
patent disclosures what technology is available for licensing and cross-
licensing, leading to a more efficient option than developing the
technology itself. I"
As to the inventor, were she to keep the information as a trade
secret rather than obtain a patent, she takes on greater risks. There is the
risk, for example, of having the information disclosed and losing the
trade secret protection, as well as the risk that someone else will
independently develop the invention (in which case the inventor would
be without recourse). I9' Weakening patent protection would therefore
lead more inventors to choose trade secret protection, the secrecy of
which does not promote innovation. 9"
B. THE CASE FOR EXPANSION IS NOT PERSUASIVE
For those who advocate expansion of the experimental use
exception, the underlying reason appears to be the belief that such
expansion will promote progress and innovation. Other than the
theoretical supposition that a narrow experimental use exception will
lead to less innovation, there has been no demonstrable evidence that
such is the case in practice. Even major research universities concede
that "the more one limits the patent rights conferred by Congress, the
less one promotes the progress of science.. .""' Similarly, the Patent and
185. Michel, supra note 102, at 392.
186. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 266
('977).
187. See Ben T. Yu, Potential Competition and Contracting in Innovation, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 215, 237
(I98I).
I88. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
189. See Michel, supra note 102, at 392-93.
19o. See id. at 395-96.
191. See id. at 391-92.
192. See id. at 396.
193. Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note 92, at 1 i.
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Trademark Office opposed legislation broadening the experimental use
exception because it would diminish the "strong incentive provided by
the patent system. ' I94
The status quo (a narrow experimental use exception) appears to
have had a positive effect on research and innovation. Our patent laws
are based on the notion of exclusivity and derive from the Constitution,
which authorizes Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'95- The
premise that a person will be motivated to innovate because the patent
laws will reward him for having expended the time and resources
underlies our system. One need look no further than the biomedical
activity over the last two decades, for instance, to see the impact that
patents have had on innovation and commercialization.' 6 Patents have
also proven critical to the large increase in biotechnology start-up
companies over the last few years, and it seems logical that they will
continue to spur growth and innovation in many areas."
The process of obtaining a patent is expensive and time
consuming.' 9 In order to be worthwhile, the right to exclude others (and
the attendant royalties and other financial benefits) must be
meaningful-it cannot be so filled with holes and exceptions that the
benefit to the patent-holder is outweighed by the benefits to the general
public. At a minimum, allowing unlicensed use of a patent deprives the
patent-holder of royalties. The patentee is contributing something of
value to research, even if that contribution consists of negative
information, such as findings indicating that something does not work.'"
If the desire to expand the experimental use exception stems from
general dissatisfaction with the patent laws as they exist today, engaging
the courts in that battle is a misguided approach. If the system is in need
of an overhaul, then reformers should seek to overhaul the system
(which seems best done legislatively) rather than eviscerate the
exemption. Strong patent enforcement is good for consumers because it
provides a valuable incentive for innovation.2 As discussed below,
194. H.R. Rep. No. 960. at 8 n.25, ioIst Cong., 2d Sess. I (I99O).
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
196. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 112, at 285.
197. Id. at 286-87.
198. See Vance Franklin Brown, Comment, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer
Software: An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C. L. REv. 977,
98r (r988) (stating that obtaining a patent is an expensive process that can often take up to five years);
see also Raymond E. Vickery, Jr.. The Laws and Outer Space: Intellectual Property, 4 J.L. & TECH. 9,
1o (1989) (noting that obtaining a patent can take a number of years and cost thousands of dollars).
199. See Michel, supra note 102, at 395.
200. John Shepard Wiley Jr. et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REv. 693, 715 n.84
(99o).
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Congress should only step in to chip away the rights of patent-holders
when it determines that a compelling need has been established in a
particular area.
C. SCOPE OF PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION HARD TO DEFINE
Among those who favor expansion, there does not appear to be a
clear consensus on the precise parameters of the infringement
exemption. They seem to have a difficult time defining precisely where to
draw the line in the delicate balance between protecting the patent-
holder's rights and fostering research and innovation.' Should the rule
be that all research universities are exempt, that only research tools are
exempt, or that a particular type of research is exempt?
Some have proposed the rule that no patent infringement occurs as
long as the experimenter is an academic or other non-profit research
institution 2 However, if the researcher develops a commercially
patented invention, then the researcher should pay royalties to the
patent-holder for any patents used in the design." These proposals fail to
clearly define or identify the point at which a commercialized product
has been created for the purpose of requiring the royalty payments.
Would it occur at the marketing stage, the product testing stage, the
order solicitation stage, or some later stage?
Given the ties between universities and industry discussed above,
this expansion may pose another problem by allowing corporations to
circumvent the experimental use exception due to their affiliation with a
university on a particular project. In other words, had the identical
research been conducted in the corporation's laboratory, it would have
fallen outside of the experimental use exception. However, conducting
the same corporate-sponsored research in the university's laboratory
provides a protective cloak.
The proposals for expansion also appear to exempt from
infringement a researcher who uses a patented device for its intended
purpose as a tool for conducting research."' To allow this kind of
infringement simply because the tool was used in a university's research
lab (the patentee's market) completely circumvents and eviscerates one's
patent rights. Even universities themselves who hold a large number of
these patented research tools would have to concede that, at the very
least, such a program would not be desirable because it would cause
them to lose royalty payments.
201. See, e.g., Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91
Nw. U. L. Rev. 667, 699-700 (i997); Caruso, supra note 5, at 220; Derzko, supra note 5, at 366-367;
Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-146; Sandstrom, supra note 5, at i io6-o8.
202. See, e.g., Barash, supra note 201, at 667, 699-700; Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 1 io6-o8.
203. Id.
204. See infra note 206.
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Others have proposed or debated a compulsory licensing scheme,
which includes some variation of government mandated permission to
use a patented device without consent and the payment of royalties to
the patent owner. 5
Finally, there has been much debate about biomedical research tools
and precisely how a special exemption should protect them."" It seems,
however, that the notion of allowing free research (i.e., without the
alleged burdens of obtaining permission) and later payment of royalties
only if the research has led to a commercialized product is already the de
facto rule. It is highly unlikely that a patent-holder will discover
infringement or even sue an early stage researcher because, among other
reasons, the damages would prove too small to justify the cost of the
litigation.2" Rather, serious negotiations between the researcher and the
patentee occur toward the later stages of the product development
process, because at that point they both have greater reasons and
incentives to strike a deal. To the extent that university labs continue to
resemble their commercial counterparts, justifying special treatment for
universities will become even more difficult.
There is one further view that deserves discussion: the suggestion
that, like copyright law, there should be a fair use exemption to patent
law.?° The doctrine of fair use, part of the 1976 Copyright Act, permits
others to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
consent."° Thus, the argument would go, where use occurs in the context
of education, research, or other socially valuable activities, a fair use
exception to patent infringement (i.e., a broader experimental use
exception) makes sense. Even without undertaking an exhaustive review
and analysis of the fair use doctrine, however, it does not seem to be the
kind of model that patent law should emulate.
205. See, e.g., Cole M. Fauver, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 666 (1988); Alan M. Fisch, Comment,
Compulsory Licensing -of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate
Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295 (1994); Paul Gormley, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licenses and
Environmental Protection, 7 TUL. ENV-rL. L.J. 131 (993); Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-46.
206. The research tool discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. However, for additional
reference, see, e.g., Derzko, supra note 5, at 347; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at IO84-86; Mueller, supra
note 3, at I; Strandburg, supra note 5, at 81.
207. See supra Part III.C.1-2.
208. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, ioo COLUM. L.
REV. I177 (20O0).
209. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § io7, 9o Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1o7 (2000)).
The preamble to section io 7 reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section so6, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
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The fair use doctrine has been quite troublesome in copyright law
and has engendered extensive litigation (about ten times more cases than
the experimental use exception)."' Part of the reason for this problem is
the ad hoc nature of the doctrine, lacking precise definitions in order to
remain flexible to adapt to new technologies on a case-by-case basis."' It
relies on the application of four broad and vague factors to determine
whether use is fair."' However, the application of these factors has led to
inconsistent and unpredictable results. In any given case, for instance, the
majority and dissenting opinions may disagree on each factor."' It is to
be expected that an experimental use exception that resembles the fair
use doctrine will cause a tremendous increase in litigation as parties and
courts struggle to decide which activities are covered by the exemption in
any given case. Accordingly, for this reason alone, the fair use doctrine
does not present an efficient model.
It is also interesting to mention that when it comes to copying for
educational use, fair use cases mirror two of the experimental use trends
presented in this Article. First, when course packets are used for
educational purposes, the commercial copy center making the copies for
profit is not allowed the fair use defense. 4 This seems to suggest the
importance of profit or commercial motive as in the experimental use
exception cases. Second, publishers enforcing their copyrights are
choosing to sue the commercial copy centers who make the copies rather
than the universities who are the direct infringers." ' Again, this pattern
mirrors the de facto practice under the experimental use exception.
21o. A search revealed that since the enactment of the doctrine on Oct. 19, 1976, the courts have
decided 823 cases involving fair use claims. (Search parameters in LEXIS Federal & State Cases,
Combined database for "fair use and copyright" after 10/19/76; conducted on 8/2/05.) By comparison,
during the same time period, only 85 experimental use exception cases were decided. (Search
parameters in LEXIS Federal & State Cases, Combined database for "experimental use exception and
not (statutory exemption or prior use defense) and patent infringement" after io/I9/76; conducted on
8/2/05.)
211. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 9 4 th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976) ("courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis .... ); see also Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 6o (2d Cir. 198o) ("The doctrine of fair use.., permits
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster.").
212. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
213. For example, compare Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), with Justice Brennan's dissent.
214. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996);
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics, Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530-35 (S.D.N.Y. i9i).
215. See id. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics, Corp., Kinko's paid the publishers $1,875,000
and was barred from supplying course packets for ten years. Publishers Weekly, Kinko's Re-enters




D. CONGRESS SHOULD EXPAND THE EXEMPTION ONLY FOR COMPELLING
REASONS
Any expansion of the experimental use exception should occur
legislatively and only where necessary." 6  Such legislative
pronouncements, in conjunction with subsequent judicial interpretation
of legislative intent, offer the best method for addressing any compelling
public policy reasons for expansion of the doctrine. To date, Congress
has not seen fit, and has indeed refused, to broaden the scope of the
experimental use exception to protect universities."7 As this Article
suggests, such congressional refusal may be because the existence and
definition of a true problem has not been established."8
i. Exemptions to Date
Rather, Congress has acted in specific instances to grant particular
exemptions, such as that granted to the pharmaceutical industry in the
Hatch-Waxman Act."9 This process allows Congress to determine
whether an endeavor is sufficiently compelling and necessary for the
public welfare that it trumps a patent-holder's rights.2 The provision of
generic drugs,' medical devices,2 and drug development in general (as
now interpreted by the Supreme Court) has met such criteria. In
addition, Congress has also enacted an exemption for infringement of
patented medical or surgical procedures. 23 Institutional status-the mere
fact that an enterprise is a research university-has not and probably
should not fit the bill.
2. A Proposed Standard
Unfortunately, no clear indication of the objective reasons for these
exemptions appears to exist; there is no test that would guide the result
216. See Infigen. Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wis. 1999) ("[I1t
is up to Congress to decide whether there should be an infringement exemption for university-based
research laboratories.").
217. See, e.g., Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 199o , H.R. 5598, iolst
Cong. (199o) (unsuccessful bill proposing exemptions from infringement for university research).
218. One legislator noted, "The stated purpose of [the proposed legislation] is to protect university
research activity. I fail to understand what universities are being protected from. There has never been
a case, to my knowledge, where a university has been sued for patent infringement for carrying on
research on a patented invention." H.R. REP. No. iOI-96o(1), IOst Cong., 2d Sess. (599o).
219. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (West 2002); 17 U.S.C. § 906 (West 1988); 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (West 2005).
220. Congress may also require compulsory licensing in certain areas. See, e.g., Charles Pfizer &
Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 401 F.2d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969) (holding
that the FTC has authority to require compulsory licensing of tetracycline and aueromycin patents on
a reasonable royalty basis). In addition, the Clean Air Act provides for compulsory licensing of
patents on pollution control devices to those who cannot use substitutes to meet the statutory
pollution guidelines. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1989).
221. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)).
222. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 664 (1990).
223. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
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on the next proposed exemption. Even recognizing that congressional
acts are part of a political process, not guided by specific articulable
criteria, Congress could benefit, nonetheless, from standards by which to
craft legislation on this issue. Further, Congress may also choose to
articulate standards that would allow courts to deal with experimental
use exception cases.
With that in mind, this Article recommends a test that generally
balances the individual patent-holder's rights to exclusivity against
society's interests in using her invention. More specifically, in deciding
whether to permit infringement and bypass the patentee's rights,
Congress should find that the patent-holder's refusal to license224 the
invention will have an injurious effect on the public welfare and on
innovation.
To illustrate the test, it may be helpful to revisit the hypothetical
posed at the beginning of this Article with Ivan and his Gizmo. Assume
that the researchers at the local university believe that Ivan's Gizmo will
be useful in finding a cure for cancer. They seek a license from him, but
he refuses. In fact, he refuses to license it to anyone.2" Ivan does not have
the knowledge or the resources to use his device the way the university
researchers would. The matter is before Congress.26
First, Congress should examine whether Ivan's refusal to license
could have a potentially injurious effect on the public welfare. Given the
importance of finding a cure for cancer, a compelling case for an
affirmative response can be made here. Second, Congress should ask if a
compelling case can be made that the refusal could have an injurious
effect on innovation. Ivan, without the knowledge or resources, cannot
use his device to find a cure for cancer (he may not even suspect that it
has any connection to cancer). He hinders innovation (i) by not having
the ability to research and develop a potentially momentous technology
and (ii) by refusing to permit anyone else to invent the technology.
Accordingly, this situation would justify Congress curtailing Ivan's
rights,"7 and either forcing him to license the technology"' or declaring
224. Requiring that the prospective infringer seek a license first is in keeping with respect for
patent rights. It seems fair that the patent-holder have something akin to a right of first refusal on the
patented invention before having Congress decide to curtail or abrogate those rights. This
arrangement also permits the marketplace to govern the transaction. See supra Part III.B.
225. In reality, Ivan's refusal to license would be highly unusual. He would have so much to gain
from participation in finding a cure for cancer, through, for example, royalties, licensing fees, and
possible ownership interests in the cure, that it would make very little sense to refuse. See supra Parts
III.B-C. Assuming, however, that he either refuses to license or seeks draconian terms and that there
is no other alternative to using his invention, then it is fair for the public, through Congress, to step in.
226. Admittedly, Congress (unlike the courts) generally does not deal with an individual situation.
However, for purposes of the hypothetical, "Ivan" could represent a corporation or industry practice
that has created or is creating the kind of obstacle that would justify congressional intervention.
227. This could be seen as a consistent legislative corollary to the policy supporting the defense of
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that use of the device for research is not an act of infringement where it
has been shown that such use would constitute a necessary step of a
protocol for finding a cure for cancer.
CONCLUSION
The Madey court's narrow interpretation of the experimental use
exception is consistent with precedent, consistent with public policy, and
appropriate for university research. Given the nature of university
research today and its resemblance to industry research, it does not seem
fair that universities should receive special treatment from infringement
simply by virtue of their being universities. In order to make a patent-
holder's right to exclude others meaningful, any attempt to broaden the
activities that are exempt from infringement under the doctrine must be
done sparingly and only for compelling reasons. Congress should
consider expanding the exemption only in situations where a compelling
case has been made that a patent-holder's refusal to license threatens the
public welfare and innovation.
In practice, Madey will probably have very little effect on the way
research is conducted at universities. Even if researchers may technically
be engaging in patent infringement in their labs (as had become
commonplace before Madey), they are not likely to suffer repercussions.
There are various norms and considerations that greatly favor and
protect academic research in a way that will ensure its survival.
Finally, recent gaps have been created in the experimental use
exception as a result of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and because of state universities' immunity from patent
infringement. Far from leaving the doctrine as an empty shell, however,
these gaps weigh in favor of saving and safeguarding the doctrine. The
doctrine is still of consequence, for instance, to private universities,
individual researchers at state universities, industrial researchers, and the
world of non-drug development researchers. Because each chip off the
doctrine signals a further erosion of patent-holders' rights and an
accompanying harm to the incentives to invent and innovate, careful
consideration of-the doctrine is still required.
patent misuse. Although a patentee's refusal to license does not constitute misuse of the patent, to the
extent the behavior has anticompetitive effects on the market, the patent may be held unenforceable.
See generally ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 21.3, at 505-08 (2003).
228. This is, in effect, a kind of compulsory licensing. However, unlike other proposed compulsory
licensing schemes, this approach is more specific and limited in terms of its scope. For instance, it does
not apply to all research tools. Cf supra note 205. Moreover, it requires, as a threshold matter,
consideration of the effect on the public welfare and on innovation in the particular circumstances. It
also grants the patent-holder an opportunity to negotiate freely with the prospective licensee before
facing the blanket imposition of a compulsory license.
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